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Abstract 
 
This doctoral thesis re-examines the phenomenon of ‘benchmark beating’, and the extent to 
which it is likely to reflect earnings management. To address this issue, the thesis considers 
two links between benchmark beating and earnings management, and these are outlined in 
two separate research papers/chapters. These are: (1) Earnings Management Incentives and 
Intra- Year shifts in the Earnings Distribution, and (2) Analyst Cash Flow Forecasts and 
Earnings Benchmark Beating by Australian Firms. Chapter One is consistent with the view 
that the incentives to manage earnings are important and suggests that tests of benchmark 
beating (or other indicators of possible earnings management) should first identify those 
cases where explicit earnings management would be of most benefit to the firm.  
 
Chapter Two investigates whether analysts, as sophisticated information intermediaries, do 
play a monitoring role in firm’s reporting behaviour.  Chapter Two documents evidence 
contrary to prior literature (e.g. McInnis and Collins 2011; Call et al. 2000; Mohanram 
2011) which highlights the disciplining implication of analyst cash flow forecasts on 
accruals and benchmark beating behavior.  In this regard, chapter two adds to the literature 
that challenges the view that analysts are leaders in communicating the implications of 
complex financial information to investors (e.g. Bradshaw et al. 2001; Lehavy 2009; 
Keskek and Tse 2013). 
  
